This debate sometimes gets entangled in legalistic quibbles. National Security Archive. Consequences of a new Cold War. Survival , 57 2 , 37 — Return to Cold War. Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs , 93 5 , 77 — This, goes the argument, is why Russia was so opposed to the association agreement between the EU and Ukraine.
Accordingly, the crisis that broke out in is best understood as a symptom rather than the cause of East—West tensions Sakwa, Sakwa, R. Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the borderlands. London : I. The Ukraine crisis and the resumption of great-power rivalry. Carnegie Moscow Center.
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In a textbook case of a classic security dilemma, NATO enlargement had thus created the very risk that it was supposed to prevent Saunders, Saunders, P. Valdai Discussion Club.
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After , Russia no longer offered an alternative ideology and did not contest the legitimacy of free elections and human rights. The stalemate in EU-Russia relations. Hopf Ed. Bush and Putin in democracy row. Thus, as the Russian scholar Lukin Lukin, A. Russia in a post-bipolar world. Survival , 58 1 , 91 — Concomitantly, the normative agenda of the West also serves to deny Russia its rightful place in the world. Given this, it is not surprising that Moscow regards them as a threat see, e.
Casier, Casier, T.
Foreign policy of the United States
From logic of competition to conflict: Understanding the dynamics of EU—Russia relations. Russia, the West and the integration dilemma.
Survival , 55 6 , 49 — Review of International Studies , 24 1 , 23 — Such exercises only serve to exacerbate existing tensions and thus contribute to, rather than reduce, insecurity in Europe. This concerns in the first place Ukraine and the states in the South Caucasus.
Short of recognizing a Russian sphere of influence there, the United States and its allies should observe non-interference in countries that Moscow considers essential to its security. Third, the West should drop the current economic and diplomatic sanctions against Moscow. They only serve to estrange the Russian public while at the same time deepening and lengthening the conflict.
As Tsygankov Tsygankov, A. Vladimir Putin's last stand: The sources of Russia's Ukraine policy. Post-Soviet Affairs , 31 4 , — A third group of scholars argues that Russia has neither the will nor the capacity to reshape the existing international order. Russia, after all, is a declining power weakened by economic problems, widespread corruption, and a severe demographic crisis.source link
Unwrapping Russian Foreign Policy
Nor does the Putin government have a particular ideology that it wants to promote internationally. This does not mean, however, that Russia is going to integrate itself smoothly into the existing global order. On the contrary, Russia has come to play a spoiler role in international affairs. The ultimate aim of the Kremlin is to inoculate Russia from Western influences.
Such fears have been stoked by the colour revolutions in the mids, the Arab spring in —, and especially by the Euromaidan protests in Kiev in As Krastev and Holmes Krastev, I. Second, the Kremlin deliberately creates external crises to stir up nationalist sentiments. The reason is simple. In other words, there was a social contract between large sections of the population and the government. The leadership in Moscow provided for the economic wellbeing of ordinary Russians in exchange for their political compliance.
Real wages decreased, the standard of living declined, and unemployment soared.
As a result, the popularity of the Putin regime took a hit. In response to these developments, the Kremlin took measures to curtail the activities of NGOs operating inside the country. The ultimate goal of these operations has been to distract public attention from political and economic problems at home. As Shevtsova Shevtsova, L. The Kremlin is winning. American Interest online. Third, and closely related to the previous points, the leadership in Moscow has promoted an anti-Western narrative and seeks to portray itself as a bastion of conservative values — not necessarily because Putin and his inner circle believe in those values, but because it serves the narrower interests of the regime.
The purpose is to mobilize conservative groups in Russia and create conflicts with the United States and other Western countries. Putin needed an enemy — the United States — to strengthen his legitimacy.
Russian Analytical Digest , No. Indeed, some observers and commentators straddle the line between these two analytical positions e. Lewis, Lewis, D. The Foreign Policy Centre. The Russia factor.
Journal of Democracy , 25 3 , 74 — Yet there is an important difference. In contrast, the argument here is that the Putin government uses foreign policy in an instrumental and calculated fashion to shore up its legitimacy at home. How, then, should the West deal with Russia and its self-isolationist regime? The answer to this question is less clear than it is from the previous two perspectives. After all, by the logic of the argument presented here, the Putin government seeks to manufacture external conflicts for domestic political purposes.
Thus, accommodative policies towards Russia will lead nowhere. If anything, they will incite the Kremlin to create foreign policy crises elsewhere. Likewise, the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia will backfire, as it provides the Putin government with the opportunity to isolate the country further from the West. Krastev and Leonard Krastev, I. The new European disorder. London : European Council on Foreign Relations. Sanctions also provide Putin cover to push for managed isolation from globalization through policies designed to nationalize the internet, prohibit foreign ownership of the media, and limit travel.
Hence, the best option for the West might be a so-called constrainment policy. On the one hand, this might increase the pressure on the Kremlin from the inside. Not-so-smart sanctions: The failure of Western restrictions against Russia. Foreign Affairs , 95 1 , — How Putin became a problem for Russian oligarchs. Al Jazeera. Putin, or the world? Sanctions may force oligarchs to choose. The impact of sanctions on Russia. While Moscow can certainly cause trouble on the global stage in the short term, it does not have the material wherewithal or political will to undermine the existing international order.
In the medium to long term, therefore, Russia has strong incentives to establish good relations with advanced industrial states.